Abstract--In this p a p a "max-min controllability" concept for a situation in which two linear control systems are in conflict is introdoced and characterized This concept is employed in solving a max-min linearquadratic control problem with terminal state constraiots and the relationship with differential game theory is di scussed.
Here x = x ( t ) is the state vector in Euclidean space R", with x . a specified initial state at time t,. The vectors u = u ( t ) E R 9 and t' = u ( t ) E R me, regarded, respectively, as the pursuer and evader controls, are required to satisfy JIllu(t)l12dt< x and JIllc(t)l12dt< oo on each compact interval I ~[ t , , oo), where 11 11
denotes the Euclidean norm. The matrices A , B,, and Be are assumed to have entries which are real and measurable on [to, w). For any pair of controls u and o we shall denote by x ( t ) = +(t, to, xo, u, u) the corresponding unique solution of (1.1) emanating from x . at time to ( t 2 to).
In situations in which the pursuer and evader are in competition, it is natural to seek a comparison between their control capabilities. Towards this end we introduce the following concepts. controllable if it is strongly max-min controllable for some Definition 1.2: An event (to,xo) in system (1.1) is weakly max-min controllable if for each a_nnounced evader control 2, on [to, w), there-exists a time t,= ;(u) 2 to and a pursuer control u on [to, t ] such that x ( t ) = +(; to, xo, u, u)
Clearly strong max-min controllability of an event implies weak max-mir; controllability. That the converse is also true is not immediately evident since it is not clear that when weak max-min controllability holds there exists any one time T at which capture (i.e., x ( T ) = 0) can be imposed by the pursuer in face of any evader control. This, however, is indeed the case as is shown in [l] , and the two concepts of max-min controllability are actually equivalent, Henceforth, we will simply speak about m xmin controllability referring to the simpler Definition 1.1.
It should be observed that max-min controllability generalizes the concept of controllability in linear control systems as expounded by Kalman (see, e.g., [2] , [3]). While the existing "one player" controllability theory will be brought to bear on our development of the two player case, certain significant difficulties and interesting differences arise, as will be pointed out below.
Our results on max-min controllability will be employed in solving the following restricted end-point max-min control problem, denoted ( P ) .
( P ) : We are given a linear dual control system (1.1) with x,#O. The evader announces a control function u, and the pursuer (if he has the capability) responds with a control function u such that x ( T ) = 0, where T > to is a prespecified time. The players' control choices are to be made in accordance with the optimization of the payoff functional
where it is understood that the evader is the maximizing player while the pursuer is the minimizer.
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Let @ (t, to) denote the fundamental matrix solution corresponding to system (1.1) and define the vector function z(t) =@(to,t) where (1.5) represents the pursuer dynamics and (1.6) represents the evader dynamics. Both xp and x, are in R" and capture is interpreted as an event ( t . x,(t), x,([)) such that x p ( t ) = x e ( t ) . Hence, max-min controllability for systems (1.5) and (1.6) refers to the existence of "capture events" as defined above, with Definitions 1.1 and 1.2 remaining otherwise intact. For a fixed T > to define
z ( t ) = @ p ( T ,~) x p ( t ) -~e ( T , t ) x e ( t ) .
t o < t < T . (1.7)
With (1.7). (1.5) and (1.6) yield the following differential equation for z : 8) where & ( t ) QP(T,t)Bp(t) and i e ( t ) A ae(T,t)Be(t) for to Q t < T ; and QP( T, t ) and @,( T, t ) are the fundamental matrix solutions for (1.5) and (1.6)$ respectively. It is readily seen that xp ( T ) = xe( T ) if and only if z ( T ) = 0 and hence max-min controllability (in time T ) for systems (1.5) and (1.6) is equivalent to max-min controllability (in time T ) for (1.8).
Since system (1.8) is essentially the same as (1.4) we shall henceforth restrict our attention primarily to systems of the form (1.4) to which we shall refer as standard.
In [4] Ho, Bryson, and Baron applied the variational calculus to a linear-quadratic differential game of fixed duration (without terminal constraints). They then applied their results to problem ( P ) by means of penalty functions, and for a special case they obtained a solution as well as a sufficient condition for what we termed max-min controllability. While in the present paper we proceed from a system-theoretic rather than a variational viewpoint, our results on problem ( P ) are related to those in [4] . (In this regard see Remark 3.11 and also Section IV below.) Finally, it was pointed out by a referee that problem ( P ) has various similarities with the so called "Stackelberg solution" of a game. In this regard, the interested reader is referred to [5] and [6] .
The organization of the paper is as follows: In Section I1 we shall give an algebraic characterization of max-min controllability with some special attention to the autonomous case. In Section I11 problem ( P ) is solved, and in Section IV we compare our results with results and concepts concerning differential games with more elaborate information schemes as in Isaacs [7] and Hajek [8] , [9] , and we discuss the relation between max-min controllability and feedback.
MAX-MIN CONTROLLABILITY
For a standard system (1.4) defines the controllability Grammians for the pursuer and evader by We(to,t) 2 Jfl?e(o)i7;(o)do, t > t,
where the prime denotes transpose. Clearly W, and We are symmetric nonnegative definite (n X n) matrices. Also, since for every pair F, G of symmetric nonnegative matrices % ( F ) c 9. ( F + G) (where 9i ( e ) denotes range), it can be readily verified that the rank of these Grammians is a nondecreasing and left-co_ntinuous function of time. For the one player case, i.e., Be 0, it is well known that the pursuer can drive the event (to,zo) to (tl,zl) in system (1.4) if and only if
This result generalizes in the two player case to the following algebraic condition for max-min controllability. Theorem 2.1: Given system (1.4) with zo#O, a necessary and sufficient condition for an event (to,zo) to be max-min controllable in finite time T > to is that the following conditions hold: Wp(t,,T) In a one player linear control system (i.e., iie(t> = 0) it is well known that if an event (tO,zO) [in system (1.4)] can be steered to (T,O) , then it can also be steered to (T',O) for all T'> T. In the two player case this is no longer true in the sense that the fact that an event (to, zo) is max-min controllable in time T does not imply that the same is also true for all T'> T. Indeed, there may exist an interval ( t l , t,] (with to< t , < t, < 00) such that (to,zo) is never max-min controllable in time T for T 4(t1,t2]. This fact is not surprising when one considers condition (2.5). It is then readily observed that max-min controllability has many similarities to (ordinary) controllability to a timevarying manifold, a situation which received essentially no attention in the literature. The above mentioned phenomenon is illustrated by the following simple example.
ExampIe 2.2: Consider system (1.4) with dimensions n = mp = me =2. Let where
It is easily seen that the initial event ( 0, ( y )) is maxmin controllable at every T E I = (1,2] but never for T 4 I .
For the one player case it is immediate from (2.3) that for any to, the set of states zo such that the event (to,zo) is controllable constitutes a subspace of R". The analog of this important geometric fact is also valid in the two player case, as we now show.
Theorem 2.3: Consider system (1.4). For any to, the set C(to) of states zo such that the corresponding event (to,z& is max-min controllable is a linear subspace of R".
Remark 2.4: It is of course an immediate consequence of Theorem 2.1 that the set of states zo for which the corresponding event (to,zo) is max-min controllable in (a fixed) time T, is a subspace. Theorem 2.3 claims that the set of states zo for which the event (to,zo) i s max-min controllable in any time T is also a subspace. This is less obvious especially when considering our preceding discussion in relation to the concept of weak max-min controllaProof of Theorem 2.3: First observe that O E C (to) trivially. Also, if zo satisfies (2.4) for some T such that (2.5) holds, the same is also true for azo, a E R . Hence, to E C (to> implies that azo E C (to) for every real a. Now let z i and zi be in C(t,) and let T i denote the times satisfying (2.4) and (2.5) for z& i= 1, 2. If we assume (without loss of generality) that T 2 > 7" then zi+ z i E % ( W3(to, T')) and since (2.5) holds for T 2 it follows that zi + zo E C (to) and the proof is complete. 0 bility.
Consider now the pair of systems (1.5) and (1.6) and assume that Ap, Bp, A,, and Be are constant matrices. Define the following "controllability matrices": (2.9)
We can then state the following result for autonomous systems (which has no analog in the time dependent case). Theorem 2.5: Consider systems ( I .5) and (1.6) with A,. Bp, A,, and Be constant matrices. Assume that .xeO€ %([A,IB,]). Then a necessary and sufficient condition that for any to the event (to,xpo,xd) be max-min controllable is that
and
is max-min controllable, then it is max-min controllable in time T for every T > to.
Proof: Max-min controllability is equivalent to the existence of a time T > to such that at T the reachable set of the pursuer system contains the reachable set of the evader system. Using the standard exponential notation, this is equivalent to
which in turn is equivalent to (2.1 1) along with
eAJxpo-eAeTxeOE $ ( [ A~~B~] ) . (2.13) Now, xeoE%([A,IB,]) if and only if eAeTxeoE%(([A,IB,]),
and again applying the A-invariance property, but to the pursuer system, we conclude that (2.13) is equivalent to (2.10). Since T > to can be chosen arbitrarily the proof is complete.
0
Theorem 2.5 states essentially that if the evader initial state is evader-controllable (in the evader control system) then max-min controllability holds if and only if the pursuer initial state is pursuer-controllable and the evader reachable subspace (from the origin) is also pursuerreachable. In case Ap = A , we can subtract (1.6) from (1.5) letting x = xp -x,. This gives us system (1.1) with Bp remaining intact and Be replaced by -Be. In this case we can state the following corollary to Theorem 2.5, which is a specialization of Theorem 2.1 to the autonomous case.
Corollary 2.6: Consider system (1.1) with A , Bp and Be constant matrices. A necessary and sufficient condition for max-min controllability of an event (to,xo) ( $R (B,)E 3 (B,) we will see later that our information scheme is extremely restrictive and the evader may gain significant advantages by employing a feedback control rather than predesignated controls. This interesting situation is further discussed in Section IV.
SOLUTION OF PROBLEM (P)
In this section we will focus our attention on the fixed duration restricted end-point max-min control problem ( P ) which was introduced in Section I. We now rephrase problem ( P ) as follows.
( P ) : Given system (1.4) with zo#O, let T > to be such that (2.4) and (2.5) are satisfied, i.e., zo is max-min controllable in time T. The evader announces a control o and the pursuer responds with a control u such that the associated solution of (1.4) satisfies I( T)=O, while both players make their control choices in accordance with the optimization (evader maximizing, pursuer minimizing) of the payoff functional P (u. u ) given by (1.2).
Let the evader specify a control 1: on [to, TI. Then
f = i i e ( t ) c ( t ) d r E % [ W e ( t o , T ) ]
(3.1) expression P(Uy,.,)=w'Wp(tO,T)w-y'We(tO,T)y. (3.7)
The max-min solution will consequently be obtained as the solution (whenever it exists) to the following quadratic programming problem, which we denote P:
We shall need to make use of the "generalized inverse" M' of a real matrix M which is the (unique) solution of the so called "Penrose equations."
(where 3. denotes null space). In addition, we will make use of the fact that "x(") = X ( M f ) and of the fact that if M is symmetric so is Mt.
For a system of linear equations
the general solution is expressible as when (2.4) and (2.5) hold. Here we have simplified notation temporarily and written Wp in place of Wp(to, T ) and similarly for We. Upon employing 1) and 2), the substitu-
3) tion of (3.11) into (3.7) yields the quadratic form for some w = w ( y ) E R " . In view of the well-known Upon employing standard arguments of optimization will drive zo to 0 and minimize P (u, u) against the given u. Furthermore, as is easily venfiable, theory it is readily verified that a necessary and sufficient condition for existence of a maximum of (3.12) is that T wewp~zo€~(wewp'we-we) Assuming temporarily that y is specified, a reapplication
We Wp'We -We < 0 (nonpositive definite). (3.14)
of the minimum energy rule for the evader gives When (2.5) holds, we also have, in view of the projection u,(t)=i;(t)y property of the generalized inverse, that (3.6) we = wp wp+we.
(3.15) as evader optimal control for a given y . Furthermore, for the fixed choice of y , P(u,,u,) is given by the quadratic We will also make use of the following lemmas. Substitution of (3.21) and (3.19) into (3.4) and (3.6), respectively, yields the following formulas for the optimal controls in problem ( P ) :
u * ( t ) = & t ) [ W,'W,(( we-W p ) + Z 0 .*(t)=ii;(t)[(we-w , ) t r o + % ( W e ) + a ( w e -W , ) ] . + % ( W e -W p ) ) + % ( W p ) ] (3.22) (3.23)
Remark 3.3: For the one-player case (i.e., B,(t)=O), formula (3.22) reduces to the optimal control law. in [2] and [3] for the problem of driving the event (tO,zo) to ( T , 0) with minimum energy. Formula (3.23), however, has no analog in the one-player theory. Notice also that for existence of solutions in the one player minimum energy problems, conditions beyond controllability [such as (3.14)] do not arise since the individual Grammians are always semidefinite.
We shall now compute the optimal value P(u*,o 
P(u*,c*)> P(uo,uo)~>O. Furthermore, P(u,o,)=O if and only if zoE % (W;)= 9Z( W,). But by (2.5), a ( W,)
c %(We) and hence, if P(uo,ua)=O then zoE %( W, -We) which together with (3.17) implies zo= 0. Thus, given that zo#O, the evader, by declaring o*, is assured that any pursuer control which steers (to,zo) to (T,O) uses strictly more energy than JEllv*(t)l12dt. Our observations are summarized in the following. Theorem 3.4: Consider a standard system (1.4) with zo#O and let T > to be such that (2.4) and (2.5) both hold.
A necessary and sufficient condition that there exist optimal controls u* and c* in problem ( P ) for the pursuer and evader, respectively, is that (3.14) and (3.17) hold. =%(Wp> (3.27) if and only if in addition %( W e ) c %( We-W,) holds. Formula (3.26) implies that, given (2.5), the set of events ( fo,zo) for which there exists a solution to problem ( P ) is contained in the set of max-min controllable events, which of course was to be expected. However, (3.27) indicates that max-min controllability in general does not in itself guarantee existence of an optimal solution to the max-min control problem ( P ) . Hence, there may exist events which are ma-min controllable but for which an optimal solution does not exist. This interesting situation deserves some further investigation. We now turn our attention toward deriving a more tractable characterization of the semidefiniteness condition (3.14). To tlus end we require the following lemmas. The following all hold. 
1) W:-
Since the opposite inclusion can be verified similarly, the proof is complete.
'There is no "only I ' in 3); see Lemma 3.9.
3) An immediate consequence of 1) and 2).
0
Combining Theorem 3.4 and Lemma 3.7-3) yields the following result upon noting that Wp-We > 0 implies (2.5). Corollary 3.8: Consider system (1.4) with zo#O and let T > to be such that (2.4) holds. In addition assume that %(We)= %( W,) (where We and Wp are abbreviations as in Theorem 3.4). Then a sufficient condition for the existence of an optimal solution to problem ( P ) is that (3.17) holds and Wp -We > 0.
In Lemma 3.7 we were able to replace condition (3.14)
with the simpler condition Wp-We > 0, provided we assumed %(We) = %( W,). In the next lemma we will prove that the same simplification can be accomplished if instead we assume that 3 ( W,)= R". Lemma 3.9: Assume % (W,) = R" (i.e., Wp >O). Then (3.14) holds if and only if Wp -We > 0.
Proof: There exists a nonsingular real matrix R such that R We R = A and R ' Wp R = I where A is a diagonal matrix with nonnegative entries (recall the proof of Lemma 3.6). Now Wp-We= R -' ' ( I -A ) R -I . Also, 1) A necessary and sufficient condition that there exists an optimal solution to problem ( P ) for every event in { t o X R " } is that Wp -We >0, in which case the optimal pursuer control [as given by (3.22)] is unique.
2) If Wp -We is singular, then a necessary and sufficient condition that there exists an optimal solution to problem ( P ) for an event (to. zo) is that zo E 9 (We -W,) and Wp -We > 0.
Remark 3.11: In [4] problem ( P ) was solved via a variational penalty function method for the special case where Wp -We > 0. The authors of [4] suggested that Wp -We >O meant that the pursuer was "more controllable" than the evader, conveying the intuitive idea that a kind of (max-min) controllability property exists. Indeed, Wp -We > 0 implies (2.5). From the development in the present paper, however, we see that max-min controllability can hold in the absence of definiteness conditions on W, -We.
Consider, for example, Wp= I and We= e.g., [ 16, p. 15] 
Remark 3.12: Due to the Cauchy-Binet theorem (see,
IV. FURTHER REMARKS
In this section we shall address ourselves to the comparison of our results in the previous sections with certain results and concepts in the existing body of differential game literature.
We have refrained from calling ( P ) a differential game such that due to the information structure which we have imposed on the problem. If we allow the evader some measurements of the state, the conditions derived in Section I1 may no longer be sufficient for the pursuer to force the initial state to the origin in system (1.4) even in the autonomous case. To see that this is the case consider the following simple example.
Example 4.1: Consider system (1.1) with
The initial event is ( 0, (i)) and it is easily seen that conditions (2.12) and (2.13) hold. Hence, the initial event is max-min controllable in system (1.1). If, however, the evader employs the linear feedback rule u ( t ) = K x ( t ) with K = (0, l), then no pursuer control can steer the initial state to the origin in finite time. Example 4.1 indicates that under certain conditions, the evader has the capability, by employing a constant linear feedback control, to destory the max-min controllability property and hence prevent the pursuer from ever being able to force capture. We will now show that this capability is, indeed, quite general.
Consider system (1.1) with A , Bp and Be constant real matrices and assume For the nonantonomous case [i.e., system (1.4)], allowing the evader only one obsercation of the state may prevent the pursuer from steering (t0,z0) to the origin even though (2.4) and (2.5) (Le.? max-min controllability) hold. This phenomenon is illustrated in the following example. One can readily check that 9 , [ W, (0,3) T ) , and that the autonomous version of (1.1) satisfies this condition. In fact, the same comment holds if we allow the evader any finite number of observations of the state.
One further digression on the subject of feedback is in order. The optimal controls u s and c*, given by (3.22) and (3.23), respectively, may be written in linear feedback form. Following [3, p. 481, we obtain U*(t)=u*(f,z*(t))=i;(l)((wp~(7,T)Wp(7,T)
.(we(7,T)-w,(T,T))+Z*(r)
+ a [ w e ( T ) T ) -W p ( T , T ) ] ) + a [ w , ( 7 , T ) ] ) (4.6) and C * ( f ) = C * ( f , Z * ( f ) ) =~~( f ) ( ( W e ( T , T ) -W,(T,T))' . Z * ( t ) + q [
we(T,T)]
+%[ w,(T,T)-W,(T,r)l)
( 4.7) where z*(r) is the solution to (1.4) associated with the controls given in (3.22) and (3.23). While (4.6) and (4.7) provide a nonunique closed-loop synthesis of u* and c*, these formulas do not provide optimal feedback control laws: indeed, Examples 4.1 and 4.4 show this.
We now shall turn to certain questions of values and saddle points. First, consider problem ( P ) and suppose the zo E 3 [ W,(to We can define a "min-max" game: The minimizer (i.e., the chooser of u ) declares his control first. The maximizer then chooses a control t; such that zo is steered to 0. In view of conditions (3.14) and (3.17) we see that the maxmin and min-max simultaneously exist if and only if zo = 0 and We(ro. T ) = W,( to, T ) . Thus, value in an open-loop sense for the restricted endpoint problem discussed herein exists only for a very special situation.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ALTOMATIC C O~O L , AUGUST 1976 We shall conclude by noting the connection between our results in Section 111, the results of Ho, Bryson, and Baron [4], and Isaacs' approach to differential games. Consider a differential game with dynamics (1.4), payoff P ( u , u ) = ( Y l l~( T ) l l 2 +~= l l u~~~l l v ( t ) l l~~t~I l~ 2) and letting a+co in the free endpoint game, we have that the value V ( a ) converges to P ( U * , C * ) , our max-min. The approximating games have closed-loop saddle points, while ( P ) , in general, has not even a value in Isaacs' sense. Arguing similarly, one can also prove that if o is required to lie in a ball { w E R e : 11 wII Q /3 } then there exists a feedback law u ( z ) for the pursuer such that against any admissible evader feedback law the associated solution of (1.4) satisfies 11z( T)ilQ y , where y > 0 depends on /3. As is seen in Example 4.1, however, for the case y =O there might not be such a pursuer feedback law for any /3 >O.
